Can arms control incorporate emerging technology? Other articles in this special issue identify potential risks emerging technologies pose to stability and how they are intertwined with international politics. This article looks ahead to explore how arms control might reduce those risks, but in order to do so we must update concepts of both arms control and strategic stability. Building on Thomas Schelling and Morton
States and Russia are more dangerous than at any point since the end of the Cold War, and emerging technologies, such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), will exacerbate risks of misperception, military competition, and inadvertent escalation. 2 Other articles in this special issue highlight the potential threats emerging technologies pose to international politics and stability. This article offers an original framework 3 for examining how arms control might evolve to incorporate these emerging technologies, asymmetric arms control, defined as cooperative measures of self-restraint in which states make non-like-for-like exchanges, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Arms control was, in the past, seen as a key element of promoting strategic stability, international cooperation, and peace. There have been, to be sure, critics of this view. A new challenge, however, has emerged that is of concern for both advocates and sceptics of arms control -how to manage the emergence of new and varied technologies that threaten peace and stability, but which are hard to define as part of one domain.
Strategic stability offers a useful lens for addressing these conceptual, technological, and political challenges. During the Cold War, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin 4 , along with others, argued that one objective of arms control was to strengthen strategic stability, defined as arms race stability and crisis stability. 5 Arms control was about the management of weapons rather than disarmament 6 and provided 2 See, for example, Aaron Miles, 'The dynamics of strategic stability and instability ', Contemporary Security Policy, 35/5 (2106) , pp. 423-437. 3 Lieber and Press highlight the need to challenge existing models of arms control, whereby, 'In the past, many arms control advocates believed that arms cuts reduced the incentives for disarming strikes; whether right or wrong in the past, that assumption is increasingly dubious as a recipe for deterrence stability today.' 3 Keir Lieber and Daryl G. Press, 'The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence ', International Security, 41/4 (2017), pp. 9-49. 4 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961) . 5 For a particularly useful discussion on the evolution of the concept of arms control in relation to disarmament, along with controversy around the term 'strategic stability', see Benjamin Wilson, 'Insiders and Outsiders: Nuclear Arms Control Experts in Cold War America', Dissertation submitted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2014. 6 See, for example, Jeffrey D. McCaulsand, 'Arms control and the Dayton accords', European Security, 6/2 (1997), pp. 18-27: ' "Arms control" refers to agreements between two or more states to limit or reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations in order to diminish the possibility of conflict…. "Disarmament" is normally imposed by a state or a group of states at the conclusion of war…. This distinction is important because, while an arms control regime is maintained by a harmony of interests among the participants, disarmament requires external pressure to insure implementation F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y transparency that could reduce risks of misperceptions during a dangerous crisis. This approach linking arms control and strategic stability has been largely ignored in recent scholarship, however, which focuses on three debates within arms control.
First, critics of the strategic stability approach argue that historically arms control has been a technical counting exercise, and it needs to adopt a more holistic and political approach. 7 Second, a select group of scholars have engaged with questions about the formality of arms control, and whether or not arms can contribute to international security by becoming more flexible and moving away from legally-binding treaties. 8 And finally, policy circles offer numerous recommendations for future arms control agreements, but few of them examine the underlying political and stability factors that shape arms control.
This article begins by building on Schelling and Halperin's classic thesis linking arms control and strategic stability, and redefines the underlying principles of arms control as crisis stability, arms race stability, and an arms control norm. Second, the article identifies three new challenges to strategic stability which thus far have eluded arms control efforts-different perceptions of strategic stability, the increasingly asymmetric nature of stability, and the potential of emerging technology to upset stability, specifically HGVs. 9 Finally, the article outlines the asymmetric arms control typology and includes six scenarios for HGV arms control as demonstrative examples. This study offers an original contribution to scholarship into the impact of emerging technology on international politics. It highlights the need for dynamism in any arms control framework to promote strategic stability in a rapidly changing era of geopolitical and technological uncertainty. Indeed, given the increasingly crossand compliance…. It is also critical to recall that arms control is a 'method or means' to achieve the "objective" of improve security. But arms control is not an objective by itself. ' pp. 18-19. 7 Nancy Gallagher, 'Re-thinking the unthinkable: Arms control in the twenty-first century ', Nonproliferation Review, 22/3-4 (2015), pp. 469-498; and Neil Cooper and David Mutimer, ' 
Revisiting Strategy and Arms Control
In their seminal 1960's text, Strategy and Arms Control, Schelling and Halperin link arms control to strategic stability as a means of managing the arms race and avoiding limited or accidental war. From this perspective, arms control can be defined as the management of weapons, rather than their elimination. Schelling and Halperin's definition from the Cold War resonates today and is worth quoting at length: [A] ll the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments. 11
This approach emphasizes that arms control is a tool for achieving strategic aims through cooperative restraint rather than military competition. For Schelling and Halperin, the objectives of arms control include strengthening strategic stability, reducing the incentives for conflict, reducing the damage if conflict occurs, and economic savings. Focusing on the first objective, arms control can strengthen strategic stability by reducing the risks of arms races and crises, and by promoting an arms control norm. To better understand if arms control can strengthen strategic stability in an era of geopolitical and technological change, it is worth revisiting these traits of strategic stability.
Looking to arms race stability, states often pursue costly new military technologies due to uncertainty and, 'a constant fear on either side that the other has developed a dominant position, or will do so, or will fear the first to do so, with the resulting danger of premeditated or pre-emptive attack.' 12 Other articles in this special issue, for example, discuss the potential for artificial intelligence to increase uncertainty, With regards to crisis stability, arms control reduces incentives for pre-emptive and premeditated attack because it can 'alter the character of the weapons themselves' 14 , 'reduce the general expectation of war…reduce the urgency to pre-empt' 15 , and 'reduce the likelihood that an attacker would achieve surprise.' 16 Arms control offered a means of living with uncertainty about an adversary's intentions not only by reducing capabilities, but also by increasing transparency and reducing misinformation. 17 To be clear, this is not intended to inflate the influence of arms control on broader geopolitics, but rather, borrowing from Trachtenberg, to 'influence the process' as much as possible away from misperception and escalation and towards transparency and predictability. 18 Caitlin Talmadge reinforces this point, whereby, 'although technology could directly generate some future inadvertent escalation risk, the more likely role for technology is as an enabler of escalatory policies states want to undertake for other strategic and political reasons.' 19 For Schelling and Halperin, arms control had the potential to mitigate that 'enabling' role.
Schelling and Halperin do not refer to an arms control norm, but do refer to 'traffic rules' 20 or general practices of restraint, which I include here as an objective of arms control in contributing to strategic stability. Legally-binding arms control agreements are a widely practiced behavior to promote cooperation over competition in 13 'The Scalaing of the Offense-Defense Balance, with Implications for Artificial Intelligence', this issue. 14 Ibid., p. 10 15 Ibid., p. 11. 16 Ibid., p. 12, italics in original. 17 Ibid., p. 13. 18 Marc Trachtenberg, 'The Past and Future of Arms Control ', Daedalus, 120/1 (1991) . 19 Caitlin Talmadge, 'Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold War and Implications for Today ', Journal of Strategic Studies (2019) . 20 According to Schelling and Halperin, abstaining from unilateral military action or even limited war itself are a type of arms control. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 States to engage in a qualitative arms race, although it was tied to quantitative parity with the Soviet Union. 24 But rather than discard this approach, linking arms control and strategic stability, we can instead examine new challenges to strategic stability and develop an updated concept of arms control accordingly.
New Challenges for Arms Control and Strategic Stability

In the Eye of the Beholder
The current era of geopolitical and technological uncertainty presents at least three new challenges to strategic stability. First, evolution of the post-Cold War This analysis demonstrates that strategic stability is in the eye of the beholder.
Therefore, whether or not states have an interest in arms control depends on their national interests and perception of strategic stability, which is much more complex than previous models of stability and arms control.
Quantitative and Qualitative Imbalances
A second challenge for strategic stability and arms control is the asymmetric nature of conflict, as mentioned above from the Russian perspective. Asymmetry is increasingly important in the present strategic environment, defined by its crossdomain nature, wherein deterrence requires, 'countering threats in one area (such as space or cyberspace) by relying on different types of capabilities (such as sea power or nuclear weapons, or even non-military tools, such as market access) where deterrence may be more effective.' 33 Emerging technologies allow additional opportunities for asymmetry across domains; Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe introduce the concept of 'OD scaling' (offense-defense), whereby 'growth in investments will favor offense when investment levels are sufficiently low and favor defense when they are sufficiently high.' 34 And Erik Gartzke demonstrates the potential for asymmetries in technology to extend the duration and nature of conflicts. 35 Consideration of these differences in qualitative and quantitative scale of capabilities do not readily align with Cold War models of strategic stability and arms control. These imbalances are reflected not only in capabilities, but also in broader factors such as geography, because of some states' proximity to a perceived threat and 31 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, 'Russian Strategic Deterrence', Survival, 58/4 (2016), p. 7. 32 Adamsky, p. 24. This is often mistranslated to equate to American and Western definitions of cyberwarfare, but it entails a variety of 'digital-cognitive factors' and the 'regulation of information (cyber) space in a much broader sense than the West.' p. 29. 33 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 36 Strategic stability no longer rests solely in the nuclear realm, and states will operate in other domains where they have a perceived advantage. This presents a challenge for arms control that is based on like-for-like exchanges.
As Green and Long demonstrated, however, stability through arms control is not a purely quantitative exercise, but also qualitative. States could use arms control as an opportunity to make qualitative improvements. Or, conversely, some states are negatively affected in arms control more so than others, resulting in an imbalance or instability that could actually increase risks. If the 1972 SALT Interim Agreement had set parity in number of submarines, for example, this would have been felt asymmetrically by the United States and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would have had to make significantly larger cuts to its nuclear forces than the United States and, in all likelihood, would not have signed the Agreement. To take a hypothetical example outside of the U.S.-Russia context, if the Netherlands joined the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this would have an asymmetric impact compared to a state such as Mexico joining. As a NATO member and base for dual-capable aircraft, the Netherlands would have to reject NATO's nuclear mission, cease any activities that could be construed as 'assistance' to nuclear deterrence postures, and ostensibly withdraw from NATO in its current form in order to comply with the TPNW. Mexico, on the other hand, would not have to make any changes as it does not rely on nuclear deterrence.
Emerging Technology-Hypersonic Threats to Strategic Stability
And third, emerging technologies, such as HGVs, may inspire arms races or crises, undermining Schelling and Halperin's principles for strategic stability. Schelling and Halperin's observation on the impact of emerging technologies could be equally true today:
The present race seems unstable because of the uncertainty in technology and the danger of a decisive break-through. Uncertainty means that each side must be prepared to spend a great deal of money; it also means a constant fear on either side that the other has developed a dominant position, or will do so, or 36 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 These fears and uncertainties resonated in the 2018 U.S. NPR focus on the impact of emerging nuclear and non-nuclear technologies due to, 'the potential for technological breakthroughs in the application of existing technologies, or the development of wholly new technologies, that change the nature of the threats we face and the capabilities required to address them effectively.' 38 Many of these emerging technologies also are dual-use in nature-either civilian and military or nuclear and conventional-as highlighted by Tristan Volpe's study of how technologies such as additive manufacturing interplay with the security dilemma. 39 One such technology with the potential to change the nature of threats is HGVs, which launch a missile into the atmosphere, which then re-enters on a glidepath and can be steered to a target with a high degree of maneuverability in order to evade defenses. They are capable of speeds of Mach 5 or faster, can support heavy payloads, and eventually are intended to have inter-continental range. 40 Re-entry glide vehicles are not counted under any existing strategic arms control agreement and likely can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. HGVs are discussed here not because they are the most threatening of emerging technologies, but rather to demonstrate the challenges these technologies potentially present to strategic stability and the increasing amount of uncertainty around their impact on arms races, crises, and international politics more generally. 43 China has conducted at least seven HGV tests to date, the most recent using a DF-21 ballistic missile with a range of 2,200 km although it is expected to eventually transition HGVs to longer-range ballistic missiles, such as the DF-31 that can reach 8,000km. 44 Competition in HGVs seems inevitable and all three states will feel obligated to continue in developing and deploying the technology rather than risk falling behind in a perceived 'HGV gap'. Second, HGVs and other advanced conventional weapons in high numbers may embolden states to believe they can conduct a disarming first strike. Lieber Moscow's doctrines, any future shift whereby states increase reliance on conventional weapons will complicate strategic stability. 49 Some analysts suggest the best way to strengthen strategic stability and reduce incentives for nuclear use is to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 50 ; however, if this comes at the expense of increasing reliance on conventional weapons, that may weaken stability and increase risks.
Again, these pressures would be heightened in a crisis scenario if states possessed large HGV arsenals but fewer nuclear weapons by shifting the 'burden of escalation' onto an adversary in a 'use-it-or-lose-it' scenario. 51 What these risks suggest is that HGVs are potentially destabilizing in some situations, and competition may already be a reality.
Dynamic Stability
Existing arms control models and concepts of strategic stability struggle to respond to these changes. To better understand the changing nature of strategic stability, this article draws on different disciplines that also use the concept of strategic stability, namely mathematics and ecology. The application of mathematical models to strategic stability in the arms control context is not new, given the contribution of game theory. In a 1990 mathematical model of strategic stability, a group of Russian mathematicians noted the different American and Soviet definitions of strategic stability, but defined it themselves as the absence of the capability on either side to 47 Lieber and Press. 48 Trachtenberg, p. 210 . Trachtenberg also notes that the implications of this were never realized in arms control agreements, a gap which continues to exist. 49 Miles. 50 Gallagher. 51 Brustlein, p. 45 . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 52 Parity was preferable to superiority, 'when both sides declare that they are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, this reasonably rules out the aim of reaching strategic superiority as an outcome of such a process.' 53 When directly applied to arms control scenarios, therefore, mathematical models similarly tend to focus on technical factors. Other models, however, such as TIT FOR TAT, which have been applied to arms control, demonstrated the value of reciprocity in promoting stability and moves which are not necessarily quantitative or technical, but rather are 'nice' garner more cooperation and prevent competition. 54 Applied to international security, this entails a degree of selfrestraint that seemingly challenges a self-help system.
But strategic stability is also a mathematical concept independent of its application to nuclear balancing and deterrence. In much of the mathematics literature, strategic stability is associated with equilibrium, such as the Nash Equilibrium, wherein another player's perception is an important variable in assessing stability. 55 Kolber and Mertens define equilibrium and stability in terms of cooperation -'no player can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy' and stability in a game is one in which 'no player will ever have an incentive to deviate from his prescribed strategy', as determined with the other player in pre-play communication. 56 In a 2001 study, Baliga and Sjostrom applied the Nash Equilibrium to arms races and found stability largely depended on a player's type, which was informed by 'private information.' 57 Ecology is a wholly different field that uses the concept of strategic stability to describe a balance in nature, defined as, 'the ability of a system to return to an 52 V.A. Gelovani 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 however, this approach shifted to a more 'dynamic' concept that emphasized 'dynamic balance' and 'persistence.' One expert, Orians, provided a useful framework of seven ways in which ecologists conceptualize stability:
(1) Constancy-the lack of change in some parameter;
(2) Persistence-the survival time of a system or some component of it;
(3) Inertia-the ability of a system to resist external perturbations;
(4) Elasticity-the speed with which the system returns to its former state;
(5) Amplitude-the area over which a system is stable;
(6) Cyclic stability-the ability of a system to cycle or oscillate around some central point or zone;
(7) Trajectory stability-the ability of a system to move towards some final end point or zone despite differences in starting points. 60 This multidisciplinary approach highlights two traits to inform a new definition of strategic stability-equilibrium and equanimity-that can be applied to the study of strategic stability in international security. First, strategic stability entails equilibrium, a balance wherein no state has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first because of the other side's ability to retaliate. 61 Once underlying political tensions are addressed, arms control becomes a means of signalling political agreement and 'self-propels' states to avoid military competition and instead seek out cooperation. 62 Second, strategic stability is also characterized by equanimity, or the ability of states to avoid escalation and return to a state of equilibrium despite perturbations in the international system, such as the emergence of new technologies, threats, crises, or conflicts. Cold War theorists inherently recognized the need for states to respond to geopolitical shifts with caution, such as Schelling and Halperin's observation that a system is, '"stable" when political events, internal and external to the countries involved, technological change, accidents, false alarms, misunderstandings, crises, limited wars, or changes in the intelligence available to both sides, are unlikely to disturb the incentives sufficiently to make mutual deterrence fail.' 64 In a recent study on the concept of strategic stability, Miles similarly concludes, 'True stability would go further by providing mutual restoring forces to drive adversaries to back down-to deescalate a crisis, or to revise their aims, or to stop expanding their arsenals, or even to reverse an arms buildup.' 65 This multidisciplinary approach highlights the complexity around strategic stability.
Indeed, hypersonic technology may not necessarily be as destabilising as its critics suggest, if possessors, policymakers, and analysts can adopt a more dynamic approach to stability. A more nuanced and sanguine approach to strategic stability may indeed challenge the general pessimism about emerging technologies as suggested by the introduction to this special issue, whereby 'the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution'-few technologies fundamentally change conflict dynamics, and the effects of technology are 'variegated.' 66 What does this mean for arms control? Given that strategic stability is in the eye of the beholder and asymmetry is increasingly a trend in international conflict, particularly across domains, arms control can respond by adopting the principles of dynamism, equilibrium, and equanimity in order to remain a tool for strengthening strategic stability.
Asymmetric Arms Control Framework
Asymmetry in arms control can take many forms, and any discussion into asymmetric options for incorporating emerging technology is at risk of getting muddled without a 64 more rigorous and structured approach. To address this challenge, the following framework examines opportunities for asymmetries in reductions, asymmetries in ceilings, and asymmetry across domains within arms control agreements. To demonstrate the utility of the typology in exploring opportunities for arms control and emerging technology, the discussion includes scenarios for HGV arms control. The framework and scenarios are evaluated in the conclusion. It is worthwhile to observe at the outset that asymmetry is not a wholly new practice in arms control, nor the notion of flexibility in ceilings, as evidenced by the historical examples offered here. 67 What this framework hopes to do, therefore, is offer a more systematic approach to asymmetric arms control in the hopes that it opens intellectual space and policy opportunities to manage risks associated with emerging technologies
Asymmetry of reductions
Under an asymmetry of reductions, states agree to an equal ceiling on capabilities, such as ICBMs or aircraft; however, one state is required to make more significant reductions than the other to reach those limits. To use a social example, if we both agree to limit ourselves to five cups of coffee per week, but I am regularly drinking ten glasses whereas you drink six, we feel the effects of this agreement asymmetrically (I will cut five cups per week whereas you must abstain from only one). Drawing on an example from arms control, the 2010 New START Treaty limited the United States and Russia to a shared ceiling of 1550 operationallydeployed strategic warheads, 700 delivery vehicles, and 800 launchers. But the countries' arsenals were not quantitative (or qualitative) equivalents at the time negotiations concluded in 2010, therefore this ceiling created an imbalance in reduction requirements. 
Scenario 1: Bilateral reductions
Asymmetry of reductions is difficult to conceptualize given that HGVs are still in the development phase, therefore there is nothing to reduce at present. Nonetheless, we can envision a scenario following a U.S.-Russia HGV arms race, in which they agree to reduce to an agreed upon limit, hypothetically 100 vehicles each. Ostensibly, one side would have been further along in its development and its HGV technology may have a qualitative advantage. Therefore, while Washington and Moscow agree to limit themselves to the same number, one makes a smaller cut or is quantitatively betteroff. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Such an exchange would largely depend on HGV ranges, technology, and any progress in HGV defense.
Asymmetry of ceilings
Asymmetry of ceilings-Scenario 3: Hypersonic 'haves' and 'have-nots'
This scenario would use the model of the NPT in which a multilateral agreement permitted the United States, Russia, and China to continue to develop and deploy HGVs to an agreed limit, and all other states would agree to refrain from doing so.
Essentially, it would create hypersonic 'haves' and 'have-nots'. There would be no verification, but all states parties would agree to various confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as regular consultations and meetings about the risks associated with HGVs. This might be thought of as similar to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but with three states having exceptional status.
Asymmetry of domains
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Control which placed limits on five types of weapons across two domains (land and air) for three principle countries, one of which included two subsidiary groups. The Sub-Regional Agreement recognized, 'arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region.' 73 Table 3 , Actual and Allowed Armaments Under the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement, compares reductions (and buildups) across domains and weapon types as part of the post-conflict peace process. 75 The agreement was initially based on a 5:2:2 ratio, 'basing allotments of weapons primarily on relative populations', and entailed CBMs, such as the right to observe large-scale exercises and inspection of 10-20% of treaty limited items. 76 Admittedly, there are challenges with comparing arms control in small arms and a All the scenarios offered here face limitations, but they also offer a creative approach to adapt arms control to emerging technologies and strategic stability that includes nuclear and non-nuclear components.  HGVs cannot be co-located with nuclear delivery systems.
Asymmetry of domains-Scenario 4: Cross-domain CBMs
 On-site verification, data exchange, and a consultative committee.
 Declaratory statement that HGVs will never be used to target nuclear forces.
Asymmetry of domains-Scenario 6: Two-Stage Limitations
In the final scenario, the United States and Russia would agree to an overall limit of 1000 nuclear warheads on 600 delivery vehicles, to include HGVs, TNW, and strategic delivery vehicles. A similar format was adopted for New START itself, forces so as to compensate for the additional HGVs into their ceiling limits, but these reductions in nuclear forces would be asymmetric depending on force posture and decisions about how many HGVs to deploy and allow for flexibility on both sides.
Unlike New START, however, China would join the agreement at a 5:1 ratio in both nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles to the United States and Russia to account for the current imbalance in strategic forces.
Conclusion: Arms Control Dynamism
The goal of this final section is to evaluate the asymmetric arms control framework, Conversely, O'Connell's historical analysis argues that the legal nature of treaties offers the most benefit for international security with predictability in an era of uncertainty. 85 Is cross-domain arms control, to include asymmetries, better served by informal and flexible agreements, or does it necessitate legally-binding treaties with verification?
Potential criticisms of the framework resonate with historical arguments that arms control did not do what it promised 86 , favored the superpowers at the expense of all other states 87 , and offering limited tangible gains aside from economic savings. 88 And more recently, Gallagher arraigned technical or quantitative approaches to strategic stability, which could also apply to these options for arms control:
[A] predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. 89
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